This post is mostly going to serve as a recap. Hitting (and baseball in general) is complex, and the “how” and “why” for each player’s offensive outcomes tends to be too involved as to be done justice in any kind of aggregate overview. Rather, this post is just going to serve as the answer to “what” and a comparison of actuals to both expectations and peripherals. If you regularly check the Fangraphs and Baseball Savant pages of the Braves’ batters, you probably won’t find much new here.
Also, a brief word about the significance of the 200 PA mark: there really isn’t one. Different offensive stats stabilize or gain what a person might subjectively consider an appropriate degree of predictive power at different PA/ball in play thresholds, and 200 isn’t anything special in this regard. However, I’m a fan of using it as a cutoff for a first-look “hefty sample” for the following basic reason: if you take all the position players with X PAs in a year and array them, the median wRC+ (and similar stats) for these players becomes the actual league-wide wRC+ (and similar stats) only when X goes down to 200. In other words, the median player qualified for the batting title is not the same as the average player, because only better hitters get 500+ PAs in a year, relative to all hitters. The median player qualified for the batting title tends to have a mid-110s wRC+! As you drill down to 400 PAs, 300 PAs, and so on, you get closer to a 100 wRC+ for the median player, but only once your field is around 350 players with 200-plus PAs each do you get the neat result of median wRC+ = league mean wRC+. Again, that doesn’t inherently have meaning, but it’s as good of an arbitrary cutoff as any.
Ozzie Albies
What were the expectations? The projection systems generally saw Albies as an average-to-slightly-above (100 to 106 wRC+) bat, with above-average that made him a solid 3- to 4-win player with no durability or playing time concerns.
What have the actuals been? .255/.311/.417, 92 wRC+, .162 ISO, +0 DRS, +0.8 UZR. 0.7 fWAR in 222 PAs. In short, Albies has ended up off his expected pace. While we’re still at the point where a few good or bad games can substantially impact wRC+ (e.g., Albies was at an even, 100 wRC+ before the start of the Giants series), it’s probably fair to say that Albies has fallen on the side of underperforming expectations. The Braves’ defense as a whole hasn’t really racked up the same kind of defensive value (especially not by UZR) in the first third of the 2019 season that they did last year, so the sum total is that Albies is on pace for a 1.9/600 and 2.3/719 season, both of which are a full win off his expected pace.
What about predictive/other peripherals? Albies has gotten a little unlucky so far this year (.325 xwOBA, .316 wOBA) — balancing out of this should help bring his offensive output more in line with the original average-y expectations for him. His DRC+ of 102 also suggests that he really should be thought of as the same average-as-expected bat rather than something a little below.
Any other thoughts? Albies’ 2019 has been really weird so far, in the context of his 2018. He’s made both substantial gains in meaningful statistics, while at the same, torching other aspects of his game in disappointing ways. His barrel rate and exit velocity are up, to the point where his average quality of contact is pretty close to league average, rather than considerably weaker. He’s done a better job of punishing fastballs (though he’s given up some ability to crush breaking pitches in the process), which has worked because pitchers still throw him a ton of them. He’s walked more, reined in his first-pitch-weak-contact tendencies, and done better at fighting bad pitches off when he swings at them, which has helped him to stay alive longer. But, all of that is in some kind of Manichean battle against his skyrocketing chase rate, which kind of renders all of those other gains moot. (It doesn’t really, because he’d be even worse with an elevated chase rate and lacking those other things, but it’s why his overall line hasn’t really increased despite a lot of improvements.)
Albies also finds himself somewhat caught in between the trends of the game and his skillset. He uppercuts relatively more balls than he slaps on the ground, and while an increase in his liner rate has taken some of the sting out of this approach, he really does hit a lot of cans of corn. I’m hesitant to say that this is an issue because groundballs are awful, but it’s interesting to me that he’s not really altering this aspect of his game too much. Probably the best-case scenario here is that he evolves to drive with greater authority the same pitches he hits weakly in the air, but that could be a lengthy and fraught development path.
As a final note, I know that Albies’ switch-hitting (or ineffectiveness thereof against right-handed pitching) is a constant topic of conversation and consternation. In 2018, he had a pathetic .286 xwOBA against righties. It’s up to an average-y .314 this year. I don’t really expect anything to happen on this front so long as he’s average-y against righties.
Freddie Freeman
What were the expectations? The projection systems put Freeman somewhere between his 2018 and his rampage on the league in 2016-2017: a wRC+ somewhere between 134 and 145, and 4 to 5 WAR on the year.
What have the actuals been? .325/.414/.586, 165 wRC+, .262 ISO, +3 DRS, -1.3 UZR. 2.0 fWAR in 220 PAs. Oh, hey, look, it’s Berserker Freeman, back for more punishment of the league’s hurlers. While the simple pull of regression to the mean may prevent Freeman from going on this type of tear all year, he’s basically en route to have his best season ever, even with the UZR dragging his down his overall value. He’s cut his strikeout rate even further while walking a ton, and is pounding the ball with thunderous grace. He’s on pace for 5.5 fWAR/600 and 6.5 fWAR/713 if he stays healthy.
What about predictive/other peripherals? It feels wild to type to this, but Freeman has actually gotten substantially unlucky despite the insane offensive output. He has a .431 xwOBA to his .413 wOBA. Both of those numbers are quite gaudy, to the point where his ranking among his peers doesn’t really move much (10th-highest xwOBA, 13th-highest wOBA), but it’s wild that there might actually be some pressure for his wRC+ to go up (though again, regression to the mean has a pull down as well). By DRC+, his mark is 148, which isn’t nearly as exciting, but it still heralds the return of 2016-2017 Freeman.
Any other thoughts? While confirming this one way or another really requires a frank conversation with the man himself, I do wonder to what extent the apparent reappearance of the juiced ball is driving Freeman’s offensive resurgence. Perhaps none at all, as the reasons for his 2019 rampage are an even-higher-still liner rate and and much greater selectivity at the plate — his percent of balls hit “under,” which can be considered a leading indicator of how much he’s trying to loft things out of the park and correspondingly spiked in 2016-2017, is actually its lowest ever — so maybe it really isn’t the changes in the ball reflecting in his approach, but rather just the logical conclusion of what happens when an already-elite hitter somehow figures out a way to only swing at things he thinks he can murder, leading to a wild statistic that over 12 percent of his PAs (not his batted balls, his plate appearances) end in a barreled ball.
Ronald Acuña Jr.
What were the expectations? This is a tough one to answer! The expectations, based on his preternatural skillset, bloody second-half 2018 swath cut through National League pitching, and dizzying ascent to the majors, could perhaps be astronomical. Galactic. The projection systems, though, have to work with something, and they don’t have much Acuña-esque to work with, so they saw him as more of a 120s wRC+, 3- to 4-win guy for 2019. Now, at (brief) times, the kid has “struggled” in the midst of making adjustments, and those marks haven’t always looked too far off his pace. Yet, at other times...
What have the actuals been? .290/.384/.514, 139 wRC+, .224 ISO, +9 DRS, +2.0 UZR. 1.9 fWAR in 214 PAs. As noted above, there have indeed been times (roughly one third of his season so far) where his batting line was pretty close to expectations. But then, he goes off and has an insane 15-PA stretch (like he’s done so far in this San Francisco series), and up it goes. Again, these are the dangers of any kind of “live” check-in, and Acuña’s propensity for monster games and monster shots is probably going to cause these kinds of wild jumps for some time more in the future, at least until he crosses the 300-PA mark or so and there’s too much inertia for a single series to move the needle much. The defense has been much better than projected (though UZR hates his work in center field so far), and the net result is a pace of 5.3/600 and 6.2/693. Fun stuff. My guess is that exactly where Acuña ends up in 2019 is going to be the result of how his last three-four weeks of the year or so look, because he tends to change gears every 20-40 games or so.
What about predictive/other peripherals? Acuña has the 11th-highest xwOBA in baseball, but only a top 30ish wOBA. He’s been one of the 50 least “lucky” players in baseball by this measure. (And he’s on pace for five-plus wins, ha.) Only nine players have better xwOBA on contact than him (and one of them with a similar mark is Mike Trout); relatively not-too-crazy strikeout and walk rates (though both have improved from last year) are the only things stopping him from having an insane, best-in-class batting line. DRC+ has him at a 133 mark, so there’s some tension between his xwOBA underperformance, regression to the mean (if even relevant, do we even know what his mean is?), and the DRC+ to be resolved as he moves forward and accumulates more PAs.
Any other thoughts? I honestly can’t find one thing in his profile, as it stands right now, to point out as even a concern, much less a problem. He does tend to whiff in the zone a fair bit here and there, but it’s hard to say that this is a problem in and of itself, because zone whiffs can still extend the PA and offer a chance for better contact later, whereas some zone contact can be poor or inefficient. The fact that Acuña has further cut his chase rate from last year, while increasing his ability to make chase contact without impacting his batted ball authority makes my head spin.
Nick Markakis
What were the expectations? An average batting line, average-y (maybe slightly below) corner outfield defense, combining for something akin to a 1-win or 1.5-win player.
What have the actuals been? .284/.378/.432, 117 wRC+, .148 ISO, +3 DRS, -0.3 UZR. 0.8 fWAR in 209 PAs. Nick Markakis has once again defied his own age and expectations, as he’s on a 2.3/600 and 2.6/677 pace. Basically, he’s on pace to repeat last year. While the “how” warrants greater discussion, what’s interesting is that this isn’t the same type of evolution or resurgence that Markakis showed last year. 2018 was the result of intermittent launch angle improvements plus a strikeout rate dip. (The quality of contact for Markakis was also similar in 2016, but no one noticed because he underperformed xwOBA substantially that year.) 2019, though, has featured other changes — namely, Markakis somehow fishing out an extra 1 mph of exit velocity from a back pocket, while also making gains in walk rate. Those things have helped him prop up his line despite a ridiculous grounder rate. In fact, Nick Markakis is third in the majors (behind Andrelton Simmons and Tommy Pham) at balls hit to the infield (launch angle of 9 or below) at 95+ mph. He has the 16th-highest exit velocity on grounders in baseball... but only the 145th-highest exit velocity on non-grounders. If he could just carry over his approach but hit the harder stuff a bit more in the air, he’d be a monster. As is, he’s been good but not great, with a league-average xwOBA on contact that plays up up up due to great plate discipline.
What about predictive/other peripherals? The good news is that while Markakis is replicating his 2018 results, albeit in a different way, he’s been unlucky while doing so. He’s underperforming his xwOBA by .020 (.371 to .351), which should help offset regression. His DRC+ is 123, which isn’t a huge deviation from his 117 wRC+, but still a positive one.
Any other thoughts? A substantial aspect of Markakis’ 2019 success has been an ability to punish breaking balls in a way he wasn’t before. It’s kind of fascinating how he keeps pulling out new tricks to keep himself relevant. Probably my favorite Nick Markakis stat is that he’s had marginally faster sprint speed in 2018 and now in 2019 than previously. Who does that, in their mid-30s? Nick Markakis, that’s who.
Dansby Swanson
What were the expectations? After years of offensive futility, the projections expected an unimpressive wRC+ below 90, coupled with above-average defense at shortstop. The net expectation was something around a 1.5- to 2-win player.
What have the actuals been? .254/.315/.463, 101 wRC+, .209 ISO, +2 DRS, -0.9 UZR. 1.0 fWAR in 200 PAs. At this point, it wouldn’t be surprising if Swanson ends the season as the biggest projection outperformer among the Braves. You know it, you’ve seen it, he’s kind of a different guy altogether. Highest barrel rate, highest exit velocity, highest launch angle, highest everything. Before this season, his highest full-season percentile metric for anything about contact quality was 34th percentile. This year, his lowest is 67th percentile. Throw together the fact that he’s figured out non-fastballs but also has begun to mash fastballs, a lower chase rate, and probably the prettiest launch angle chart I’ve ever seen over a 200-PA sample and “most improved Braves batter” is too big of an understatement to be worth uttering. Swanson is on pace for 3.0 fWAR/600 and 3.2/648.
What about predictive/other peripherals? The funny thing, or perhaps not very funny thing at all, if you’re Dansby Swanson, is that the two months where Swanson appears to have figured it out are also the two months where the baseball gods decide to punch him in the face repeatedly in terms of ball-in-play outcomes. Swanson is not the unluckiest player in baseball (41st) nor even the unluckiest Brave (Acuña), but only Kyle Schwarber and known shift-magnet Kendrys Morales have a greater xwOBA and a lower wOBA. (And Morales doesn’t count because at some point, it’s your own fault that you just hit the ball hard in the same place every time.) A 73rd percentile xwOBA that results in basically an average wOBA is tough, yet that’s where Swanson is right now. It’ll be a shame for him if pitchers adjust and he can’t maintain his same production, as his surface stats will reflect an average hitter that stayed the same or got worse, rather than giving him a bigger head start against which to battle decline or regression. His DRC+ is 107, which isn’t quite as suggestive upwards as his xwOBA, but still better than his current results indicate.
Any other thoughts? Swanson has 17 barrels so far. That’s more than Josh Donaldson, and two more than he had all of last season. About a third of his career fWAR has come in his 200 PAs this season.
Just for fun, and to re-emphasize my own belief in the importance of distributions rather than point estimate, here’s where these five guys stand in terms of projected percentiles for wRC+, WAR, and WAR/600 from IWAG. The main caveats are that A) WAR is going to be lumpy based on injury or not, and since these are the five guys that have reached 200 PAs already, they’re already going to be ahead of the curve (self-selection bias, here basically); and, B) the distributions are based on full-season performance so comparing 200-PA performance to projected full-season performance is basically pointless in this context, though fun.
Albies
- wRC+ — 7th percentile (though, as noted, it was closer to like 39th percentile a few games ago)
- WAR — 8th percentile
- WAR/600 — below defined reasonable range of outcomes
Freeman
- wRC+ — above defined reasonable range of outcomes
- WAR — 97th percentile
- WAR/600 — 90th percentile
Acuña
- All above defined reasonable range of outcomes, though with obvious caveat that a lack of comparables made this an exercise in potential frustration from the beginning
Markakis
- wRC+ — 99th percentile
- WAR — 79th percentile
- WAR/600 — 92nd percentile
Swanson
- wRC+ — 75th percentile
- WAR — 94th percentile
- WAR/600 — 89th percentile