Now is the time for the Braves to extend Acuña

For as slow as free agency was this offseason, the pace at which teams are signing their players to extensions before the regular season seems to be in warp speed. Superstars Mike Trout, Nolan Arenado, and Alex Bregman have all just signed massive extensions, and there’s still time for more extensions to be signed before Opening Day.

Which begs the question: Why don’t the Braves lock up their 21-year-old, Rookie of the Year phenom, Ronald Acuña, Jr.?

Acuña’s current situation

At the beginning of the 2018 season, the Braves manipulated Acuña’s service time by having him start the season in Triple-A and calling him up on April 25, 2025 for his debut. There are two significant consequences of doing this. First, it means that the Braves gain a seventh year of team control (six more seasons now). Second, by calling Acuña up in April versus, say, July, Acuña will almost certainly be a “Super Two” player after the 2020 season since he accrued 159 days of service time in 2018 (click the link for more explanation of “Super Two” players). This means that Acuña’s current team control will include two more years of pre-arbitration years followed by four years of arbitration.

During the next two seasons (pre-arbitration years), the Braves are only required to pay Acuña the league minimum salary, which currently stands at $575,000. However, many teams have a formula for giving raises based on performance (some are analytically-based, whereas others give standard bonus for things like becoming an All-Star or Rookie of the Year). I have not been able to find out whether the Braves have any such formula. Teams can also agree to pay above the minimum as a gesture of good will towards a star player, much like what happened with Ryan Howard and Mike Trout, but agreements to pay much higher than the minimum have typically come in the last year before arbitration.

After the 2020 season, Acuña will become arbitration-eligible as a Super Two player and enter into the arduous arbitration process for the following four years if he and the Braves do not sign a contract that covers those years beforehand . During the arbitration process, teams and players each submit what they believe should be the player’s salary for that year. If they are unable to come to an agreement, the parties have a hearing to make their case for why their valuation is appropriate, and a third-party arbiter decides the salary by picking one of the two respective proposals (but cannot choose a number in between).

Arbitration is performance based, so it is nearly impossible to guess with any certainty what Acuña’s arbitration salaries might be (at least not right now; it gets much easier on the even of him entering into the process). After winning NL Rookie of the Year, though, we know that Acuña’s salary is likely to be on the high end, especially if he continues on his current trajectory.

As a guide, Kris Bryant set the record for highest first-year arbitration salary last year with a $10.85 million salary after he won both Rookie of the Year and MVP during his pre-arbitration years. Then just this offseason, the Red Sox and Mookie Betts came to a 1-year, $20 million agreement to avoid arbitration, setting the record for highest salary for a second-year arbitration player after Betts won MVP in 2018. Also this offseason, Nolan Arenado set the record for highest arbitration salary after coming to an agreement for $26 million in his fourth year of arbitration (just before signing his extension).

While these are the highest arbitration salaries to date, it is reasonable to think that Acuña could reach or top them. If he wins an MVP during either of his next two season (a scenario that I consider very possible), he will have a strong case to match or top Bryant’s $10.85 million in his first arbitration year. When you factor in that Acuña will be arbitration-eligible for four years due to his Super Two status, his arbitration salaries could get very costly and even set records if he continues on his trajectory and stays healthy.

Again, it is very difficult to project a player’s production several years from now. However, barring something unforeseen happening, it is reasonable to think that Acuña could earn around $70 million over four years of arbitration, which would account for him earning below the record salaries listed above. (The combined record salaries for the first two years and fourth year of arbitration total $56.85 million, and adding in a third year somewhere between $20-$26 million would put the top end around $80 million over four years.)

Why it makes sense to extend Acuña now

There is a mutual reason for coming to an agreement before arbitration: avoiding arbitration. It makes for an awkward and delicate dance for teams to argue at an arbitration hearing that their player isn’t as valuable as he thinks. Even if the case doesn’t reach a hearing, coming to an agreement before arbitration gives both sides clarity and certainty, avoids potential conflicts, and is one less thing that both have to worry about during the offseason.

Another mutual reason for agreeing to an extension is the uncertainty of the labor situation. The current Collective Bargaining Agreement expires after the 2020 season, and there are likely to be significant changes in baseball. There is much anxiety about whether there will be a labor strike. Teams and players signing so many extensions this offseason could be a reflection of both sides’ anxiety about the future.

From Acuña’s perspective, signing a contract now would give him the security of having guaranteed money in case of significant injury or decline. Most pre-arbitration players are massively underpaid. FanGraphs values Acuña’s 2018 season at $29.6 million, though he was paid $575,000. If Acuña were to get seriously injured in the next few years (God forbid), he may never get the payday that he deserves.

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For the Braves, it would provide financial certainty and could get them more team control of their young star. The Braves could pay Acuña more during his pre-arbitration and arbitration years, while still well-below market value, and save money towards the end of the contract. They could also negotiate to add years of team control through guaranteed money or team options.

As for the timing, now seems right. From the Braves perspective, there should be little doubt as to the type of player Acuña is and will be after seeing his Rookie of the Year campaign and his Spring Training this year. It is clear to any rational observer that Acuña’s floor and ceiling are both very high, and he will likely be one of the best baseball players of his generation if he stays healthy. Therefore, the risk seems low for the Braves. Obviously, injuries happen, but there’s nothing in Acuña’s injury history to give the team particular concern.

The Braves also have the… I really don’t want to say it… financial flexibility to frontload some of Acuña’s contract over the next couple of seasons. The Braves current payroll sits around $110 million, while most anticipated it being around $130 million. The Braves could give Acuña a healthy signing bonus and a raise this year and still be able to make a significant addition to the team midseason. Additionally, if Josh Donaldson, Julio Teheran, and Darren O’Day are not re-signed, that will be another approximately $42 million coming off the books before 2020.

The Braves’ leverage will likely only decrease from here. The longer Acuña performs at a high level, the higher the price goes and the closer he gets to free agency, thus making him more inclined to wait it out for a massive payday.

It is also a gamble for Acuña to wait. An injury or down year could lower his value, which is currently quite high.

What would an Acuña extension look like?

Projecting salaries and contracts is a tricky business. So many factors, like service time, performance, position, and market conditions, can affect the ultimate agreement. While no comparisons are perfect, a few examples shed light on what the structure and money might be for an Acuña extension.

Ryan Braun sat in a nearly-identical situation to Acuña back in 2008. Both were named NL Rookies of the Year after playing in about the same number of games their rookie season (Braun played in 113 to Acuña’s 111). While Braun produced better offensive numbers during his rookie season (.324 BA, 34 HR, 155 wRC+ to Acuña’s .293, 26 HR, 143 wRC+), Acuña produced a higher WAR (3.7 to Braun’s 2.5, per FanGraphs). On May 15, 2008, just a few weeks into his second season, Braun inked an 8-year, $45-million deal which encompassed his second pre-arbitration year. The deal long stood as a record extension for a pre-arbitration player. (Adjusting for inflation but not market changes, the deal would be worth $52.8 million in 2019.)

The devil is in the details, though. Importantly, there was an escalator in the contract that made the deal rise to $51 million ($59.8 million in 2019) if Braun was deemed a Super Two player. Although Braun and Acuña played in about the same number of games, Acuña was on the Injured List last year and thus accrued 159 days of service time, whereas Braun only accrued 129, which is on the border of where the Super Two cutoff usually falls. Another important detail about Braun’s contract is that it included a $2.3 million signing bonus ($2.7 million in 2019).

So if we adjust this deal to Acuña’s situation, it would be like an 8-year, $59.8 million extension (accounting for inflation and the escalator since Acuña will be Super Two) to cover his two pre-arbitration years, four years of arbitration, and his first two years of free agency. However, the rate of inflation in baseball salaries outpaces the standard rate of inflation applied to transform 2008 dollars into 2019 dollars.

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There are more recent pre-arbitration extensions that can give guidance to Acuña’s current situation. Andrelton Simmon’s broke Braun’s record for the biggest extension for a pre-arbitration player with between one and two years of service time when he signed a 7-year, $58 million extension with the Braves before the 2014 season. Significantly, though, Simmons was entering his third season in the majors and was not a likely Super Two player. Thus, the deal covered two pre-arbitration years, three arbitration years, and his first two years of free agency.

Simmon’s deal differs from Acuña’s in a couple of significant ways. First, Simmons and Acuña are very different players with different trajectories. Simmons, while a great defensive player and fan favorite, didn’t have quite the same MVP-caliber upside as I think Acuña possesses. Over his first 206 games before signing the extension, Simmons had accumulated 5.3 fWAR by age of 24, whereas Acuña has produced 3.7 fWAR in his first 111 games, was the consensus #1 prospect in MLB, and won Rookie of the Year before turning 21 years old. Second, they are in different positions due to service time. Acuña has 6 more years (4 of arbitration) under team control, whereas Simmons had 5 years (3 of arbitration) left.

A very recent example is Alex Bregman. The Astros just signed Bregman to a 5-year, $100 million extension to cover his three years of arbitration and his first two years of free agency. Although Bregman is entering his final pre-arbitration year, the deal reportedly does not affect his salary for 2019. Bregman reportedly will receive a $10 million signing bonus. Like Simmons, Bregman is a year ahead of where Acuña is in service time and is not a Super Two player. Bregman’s trajectory, though, seems more in-line with Acuña, but he’s more proven after coming off of a 7.6 fWAR season.

Within hours of Bregman’s reported deal, the White Sox have reportedly signed MLB Pipeline’s #3 prospect Eloy Jimenez to a 6-year, $43 million deal before Jimenez’s major-league debut. It also includes two club options which could raise the total value to $77 million over 8 years. While this deal provides somewhat of a baseline for players with no service time, Acuña has already won a Rookie of the Year, whereas Jimenez has yet to make his debut. Acuña will command significantly higher money.

Another case to note is that of Paul DeJong, who set a record last offseason for the biggest extension for a player with less than one year of service time (like Acuña). At age 24, DeJong signed a 6-year, $26 million extension with the Cardinals to cover three years of pre-arbitration and three years of arbitration. The contract also included a $1 million signing bonus and two team options to cover his first two years of free agency at $12.5 million and $15 million. While I consider Acuña a much better player than DeJong, the structure of DeJong’s deal is interesting as someone who was similarly situated to Acuña in terms of service time.

Another factor that makes Acuña significantly different than the examples above is his age. It is difficult to fathom that Acuña just turned 21 in December. While he is only about a year or two behind Simmons and Bregman in service time when they signed their extensions, he’s about three years younger. This is significant because if Acuña signed an eight-year contract, for example, he should still be ahead of his decline phase at age 29 when the contract would expire.

It is also important to note that Super Two players have historically received a lower percentage of their free agency value during their first three arbitration years when compared to non-Super Two players. The rule of thumb is that Super Two players receive 20%-33%-50%-70% of their free agency value during arbitration, whereas non-Super Two players receive 25%-40%-60% of their free agency values. However, the cases of Mookie Betts and Nolan Arenado from this offseason seem to indicate that the top earners likely receive a higher percentage of their free agency value (e.g. Betts receiving $20 million in his second year as a non-Super Two player would indicate his free agency annual value would be $50 million, which seems out of line with the recent contracts of Mike Trout, Bryce Harper, and Manny Machado).

So where does this leave Acuña? Accounting for the above-cited contracts and the differences in situation, I think a reasonable agreement between the Braves and Acuña would be:

6 years, $65 million which includes a $5 million signing bonus and two team options at $25 million each that would escalate to $30 million if he wins an MVP during the contract.

I think such an agreement makes sense for both parties. Acuña might be able to earn more going through four years of arbitration, but that is far from certain. From Acuña’s perspective, he gets guaranteed money (which would more would be more than double the current record for a player with less than a year of service time) and insurance in case of injury or decline. The $5 million signing bonus should entice Acuña since he is making “only” $575k the next two seasons without this deal. If he performs well and the Braves exercise his options, he will still get paid well, especially if he wins an MVP.

For the Braves, this deal would be relatively low-risk due to the options. If Acuña continues on his current trajectory, they could save quite a bit of money both in the guaranteed contract and the option years. Bear in mind that a $25 million salary in 6 years is not the same as $25 million now. If Acuña is the perennial MVP candidate that I believe he can be and actually wins an MVP, the Braves will have paid $125 million for 8 years of a top player in his prime years. If Acuña does not live up to expectations, they can cut bait after paying $65 million over 6 years. Neither seem like bad options.

I will leave you with everyone’s favorite quote from the Braves’ offseason. When The Athletic’s Jeff Schultz asked Alex Anthopoulos about the lack of spending in free agency this offseason, Anthopoulos responded: “Did we promise we were going to spend more money, or did we promise we were going to have more flexibility?” Could this have been a hint that the Braves favored flexibility to lock up players they already have over spending in free agency?