FanPost

Reviewing the Infamous 2016 Fangraphs Prospect List

Been thinking about this for a little bit. You guys remember that FanGraphs prospect list from 5 years ago that everybody hated? Like, everybody hated it so bad that the author had to issue multiple corrections and pretty quickly ceased doing prospect writing entirely?

I was thinking about the career of John Gant, a former ATL prospect (via NYM) who I always really liked. I was sad when we traded him and continue to be sad at the fact that he has had a great career for STL since leaving.

But apart from the vague memory--maybe--of a few starts and a few relief appearances here and there, I bet the first thing most of y'all would remember about John Gant is when that FanGraphs guy inexplicably ranked him #2 on the 2016 prospect list. You can peruse the list on your own here--it's honestly a fascinating historical document (of a sort), and reading it transports you temporarily to period of time in the darkest days of the rebuild where this was literally the only thing we had going for us:

Evaluating the 2016 Prospects: Atlanta Braves (FanGraphs)

Perhaps you don't remember this happening. That's fine, it's probably a good thing that you don't remember niche internet drama from five years ago. But I'll try to give you the highlights. Dan Farnsworth was an almost entirely unknown figure who signed on to handle FanGraphs prospect evaluations in 2015. Prior to this, FanGraphs's prospect evaluator was Kiley McDaniel, who made the ill-fated decision to join John Coppolella's front office.

Farnsworth showed up to replace McDaniel and proceeded to quickly alienate a large portion of the FanGraphs readership by producing a number of weird prospect lists, where the rankings were somewhat mystifying and disconnected from other public evaluations of the same players. Then he published the Braves list, incensing both his preexisting critics and nearly the entirety of the Braves fandom, including many people on/from this website. The complaints generally group into three categories:

  • Farnsworth's rankings completely ignored a couple of serious prospects (Allard and Riley)
  • Farnsworth's rankings of certain players seemed to wildly diverge from the general consensus among fans (Gant and Weber are the big ones)
  • Farnsworth's evaluation system doesn't make any sense and it's not really clear how much he actually knows about the players.

His responses to these charges can be found in edits to his writeups as well as the comments. Some of the issues raised against him were legitimate, and some of them reduced to a common, unproductive line of complaint against a subjective ranking system (i.e. that it is too subjective). The ensuing drama didn't get Farnsworth fired (at least not right away), but it soured people on his analysis and, in pretty short order, FanGraphs picked up the highly impressive Eric Longenhagen as a replacement. So there's a little history for you.

Anyway, these were his ranked players, with FV grades appended at the end.

  1. Ozhaino Albies 60
  2. John Gant 60
  3. Sean Newcomb 55
  4. Kolby Allard -- Remember the FG guy had to be cyberbullied into adding Allard at all. 55
  5. Ryan Weber 55
  6. Austin Riley -- FG guy also left him off the list initially, but I think he just forgot? 55
  7. Lucas Sims 55
  8. Hector Olivera 50
  9. Max Povse 50
  10. Mallex Smith 45
  11. Mike Soroka 45
  12. Max Fried 45
  13. Touki Toussaint 45
  14. Mauricio Cabrera 45
  15. Chris Ellis 45
  16. Daniel Castro 45
  17. Braxton Davidson 40
  18. Ricardo Sanchez 40
  19. Tyrell Jenkins 40
  20. Rio Ruiz 40
  21. Andrew Thurman 40

It's, of course, unfair to judge these sorts of things 5 years out and expect that Dan Farnsworth should have had inhuman powers of prediction. We all know how this works: sometimes guys just show up out of nowhere, and sometimes guys become good (or become bad) for reasons that are entirely opaque to fans, if not to teams and players themselves. But it's worth thinking about where Farnsworth succeeded and where he failed. Remember, at the time we collectively thought this list was awful. So how bad was it really?

First, let me make an observation: of the 21 ranked players, only two of them failed to make the majors (Braxton Davidson and Andrew Thurman). Even among the unranked lower-FV guys, Peterson, Hursh, Camargo, Odom, Acuna, and Astudillo all also made major league rosters, each over multiple years. That's honestly a lot better than I was expecting, given that the entire ATL farm system in 2016 had hundreds of active players.* So, in this regard, Farnsworth was surprisingly effective at choosing which players, out of a pool of around 200 (give or take), might actually contribute to a major league team. The fact that many of them were not very good in the majors detracts somewhat, but it's still a strong indication that he was not operating off pure guesswork, as many of us suspected back when this came out.

But that's not really the full purpose of a prospect list, at the end of the day. We read these things, flawed though they are, in part for their rankings. It's one thing to know a certain player is good, but it's another thing to know whether one particular player is better than another. This is how we learn who to be excited for, as well as who would hurt the most to give up in a trade. How to create an effective ranking system (and whether it's possible to even accomplish this) is obviously a huge sticking point among people who write and consume these lists, and Longenhagen and McDaniel have spent considerable time wrestling with this topic. Their favored solution--an imprecise but broadly useful "Future Value" system--is now more elaborate and more carefully constructed than Farnsworth's rubric. But in a lot of ways it's the same general concept, and Farnsworth was nice enough to provide a chart which details, for him, what kind of MLB player corresponds to each predictive FV score. I'll reproduce it below.

m7VHeov.0.png

So, let's return to his ranked players and look at how he did. In each of these, I'll try to evaluate them according to Farnsworth's own criteria, as well as bring up any of the particular comments or concerns he mentioned in his writeup. I'm not trying to make a scorecard here--I just want to see how off-base Farnsworth actually was, to whatever extent we can really see that now.

1. Ozhaino Albies (60) - "Plus"

This seems pretty accurate. In the writeup, Farnsworth expects Albies to stick at SS (I think he does, in a universe where Swanson never gets traded to ATL). Farnsworth also notes he has a better approach from the right side, and does not expect him to hit for much power, but generally regards him as an offensively capable player with strong defense.

Unexpected power surge aside, this seems like a pretty decent portrait of Ozzie, now one of the better second basemen in the major leagues. Remember when we called him Ozhaino?

2. John Gant (60) - "#3"

I don't think John Gant is the number three starter for STL. I think he's probably technically either #4 or #5. But he's getting results--sub-4 ERAs for four years in a row now, despite some peripheral concerns this year in particular. One of the things to note here is that Gant's erstwhile sometimes-swingman role has historically interfered with his ability to accrue lots of WAR, and his best season totaled 1.1. In 2019 and 2020 he got 66.1 and 15.0 innings, respectively. Farnsworth's chart kind of falls apart here, as Gant is evidently doing more than okay in the middle of a major league rotation, yet he's probably not going to pick up 3 WAR in the process.

The writeup generally regards Gant as good but unspectacular, and that's pretty much what he's been for STL. In this sense I think Farnsworth actually correctly identified Gant as a strong MLB candidate earlier and in clearer terms than other public evaluators.

3. Sean Newcomb (55) - "#3/#4 Starter"

Farnsworth was expecting Newcomb to stick in the rotation, where this grade would net him a #3/#4 slot. But it seems extremely unlikely he'll be starting another game, and his role in the bullpen probably still has its ceiling in this zone--a medium-quality closer, which is what Farnsworth's grade translates to as a reliever. That's still somewhat removed from his actual present role, which is a kind of up-and-down reliever whose use shows very little rhyme or reason. But we're evaluating Farnsworth, not the Atlanta front office.

The writeup really feels pretty faithful to the person we think Newcomb is today: a guy with major league quality stuff and very little idea of where it's going. Farnsworth broadly agrees with this, but thinks he'll grow into his command. Will he? I dunno. Probably not, but we're still invested in finding out. Newcomb is 28.

Farnsworth is too optimistic about Newcomb's chances, and we now probably think of him as purely a reliever. He says all the right things in the writeup, which is impressive but diminished somewhat by the fact that Newcomb's scouting reports have looked exactly the same every single year he's been in baseball. Too rosy overall, but I'm not really sure this was a huge miss.

4. Kolby Allard (55) - "#3/#4 Starter"

Before 2021, this would have looked much worse. But this season, Allard has a 2.91 ERA with pretty good FIP (3.30). He's started a few games for TEX, but mostly seems to show up out of the bullpen, often for more than one inning. He's not exactly a swingman but he looks like he's sliding into a relief/spot start kind of role (he is 23, by the way). Whatever he's doing now is working, although the peripherals are kind of middle-of-the-road. So is it sustainable? Not sure. For an example of a nearly identical pitcher doing the same things as Allard who hasn't been successful, see his teammate, Wes Benjamin, and his 8.76 ERA.

Not much to say here about the writeup as Farnsworth clearly has next to no information. Most of this section is "sorry, sorry, trying to delete" type edits.

In all, Allard probably isn't a middle of the rotation guy... but he's 23 years old and currently having the best MLB season of his life, on a bad team that has no real reason to take away opportunities from him. Farnsworth probably overshoots the mark on Allard, but by a lot less than you might think.

5. Ryan Weber (55) "#3/#4 Starter"

This is the first of Farnsworth's major whiffs. We knew this at the time, and you can tell that he was bombarded with hate mail for this. As it is, the writeup basically reads like a guy trying to justify a pet favorite pitcher who doesn't throw hard by trying to come up with ways he can be successful without throwing hard--and he can't really make the case.

Weber's actual career has largely been an up-and-down AAAA type reliever whose only real saving grace is that he doesn't walk all that many people. Obviously he isn't a starter, nor is he a reliable reliever. It's very easy to clown Farnsworth for this, but on some level I do have to concede that I wouldn't have ever picked this guy to be someone who actually makes the majors, much less sticks around for years (albeit without much success). Today Ryan Weber gave up 11 runs on 13 hits for Boston.

6. Austin Riley (55) "Above Avg"

Farnsworth either forgot to include Riley in the original list, or had moved him to the "players of note" section (I forget). Anyway, this is one of the issues on which he seems to concur with the mob, and his revised evaluation of Riley broadly gets it right. Here, I'll just quote the meaty part:

He has enough athleticism to improve over time, though it certainly bears watching how well he keeps his strikeouts down. I also wonder about his pitch recognition against better competition, though the swing qualities I mention above may be the root cause of looking fooled against poor offspeed pitches as an amateur on occasion. Defensively, he has the overall athleticism and arm strength to play at least an above-average third base.

Intuitively this feels accurate to me, although it's really hard to evaluate Riley right now because of how dynamic his profile as a player is. Is Riley actually the guy who hit 60000 home runs in the month or so after he was called up? Is he actually the guy who couldn't hit for a good year or so after that? Is he a good-eye, good-power, defensively questionable 3B, as he looks right now? I have no idea. But I don't know if anybody today would be outraged by the claim that Austin Riley will be an "above average" player, perhaps maxing out around 2.5WAR in a season. That's pretty much what Farnsworth thought he would become in 2016. I dunno, I think that's pretty good.

7. Lucas Sims (55) "Mid Closer"

At the time, Sims was still being developed as a starter, but Farnsworth saw the writing on the wall and projected him as a medium quality closer. In his first couple of years in the majors, he was much worse than this. Then in 2020 he looked great, pitching in relief for CIN and getting a ton of groundballs. The ERA has backed up this year, but look at this:

FfW861Y.0.png

Still, he's not closing games consistently (he has some saves this year), nor is he posting the WAR Farnsworth expects someone of this caliber to be posting. But I don't think the book is closed on this guy at all.

I should also note that Sims has been vocal about the poor quality of Atlanta's coaching since leaving the organization. See here:

xRfvyCx.0.png

I'd note as well that Kyle Boddy, the Driveline guy who's now Cincinnati's director of pitching, has made similar comments in the past about Atlanta's horrid pitching development. Maybe these guys are just being dicks, but this is one of the clearer cases I can think of where another team/development system has turned our failures into something other than failure. If Farnsworth's evaluation seems too positive, it's possible he was seeing whatever Cincinnati saw. Or not, who knows.

8. Hector Olivera (50) "Average Regular"

No idea what to do with this one. The Olivera debacle, for those of you who somehow don't remember, was a wholly humiliating experience for Braves fans. First, Atlanta traded away a number of good players (Alex Wood among them) for Hector Olivera, a well-regarded but somewhat mysterious Cuban defector originally purchased by LAD. This trade itself was thoroughly embarrassing, as it was incredibly obvious that the return for Atlanta in no way justified the price. As a Brave, Olivera played at a mediocre level for about 30 games and then beat a woman in the team hotel, got arrested, got suspended, served his suspension, and then was traded to San Diego for Matt Kemp. The Padres released Olivera immediately, and Kemp played about as well as you would expect from a guy whose body morphed fairly rapidly into that of Big Chungus. As it turns out, the entire Olivera experience was a prelude to 2021, when another highly-touted player came to the Braves at considerable cost, played poorly, and then got arrested for domestic violence. Folks, we really know how to pick 'em.

Anyway, Farnsworth thought Olivera would be an "average regular," which was broadly the consensus at the time but which is impossible to evaluate given the circumstances of his career. I'll give him a pass here.

9. Max Povse (50) "#4 Starter"

Farnsworth missed on this one, but Povse's MLB career was basically derailed by Seattle's bizarre roster decisions. When Povse was traded to Seattle (along with Rob Whalen, in exchange for Alex Jackson), he looked good-to-OK in AA ball. Seattle decided to call him up to the majors so that he could help them lose, which he did to the tune of a 7+ ERA. Then they sent him to AAA, where he did basically the same thing. The entire time, the Mariners couldn't decide whether to try him as a starter or a multi-inning reliever, so they tried both. He puttered around in the minors in 2018, then got hurt and has since moved to indy ball.

Povse remained a viable prospect for Seattle until 2018, but could never really get it all the way together. Obviously Farnsworth's evaluation overstates Povse's abilities, but it's really hard to guess what Povse could have been had Seattle not decided to set this guy up for failure.

10. Mallex Smith (45) "Platoon/Util"

Smith's actual career nears the platonic form of a certain breed of position player--the AAAA guy who has a random 4 WAR season for no reason, then never does it again. Smith's 4 WAR season (3.5, really) came in 2018 with the Rays. He couldn't replicate that. He's recently been released from AAA while preparing to take a ride on the Mets outfielder carousel, which is known to spin at a velocity lethal to humans.

Farnsworth expected him to be a 4th OF type who has trouble hitting consistently, and whose speed (++) doesn't quite match with his actual defensive abilities. That's basically right for every year except for 2018. Smith is a little worse than a utility player now, but overall this seems pretty accurate.

11. Mike Soroka (45) "#5"

12. Max Fried (45) "#5"

I'm going to do these together because they're both bad rankings, and they're both bad for generally the same reason. Back in the day, it was fairly common to group these guys (and Allard) together in abstract discussions about pitchers in the Atlanta farm system. Fried was kind of an unknown--big prospect pedigree, but coming off a TJS that cost him half of 2014 and all of 2015. Soroka was a relatively new addition to the team and was generally thought of as an "advanced" or "mature" pitcher with middling velocity--also somewhat difficult to project. The profiles of both pitchers have changed considerably in the intervening years, both in ways that I don't think are reasonable to expect anybody to be able to predict. Soroka is now a perennially-injured SP who, when he's around, throws harder than he used to. Fried is also somewhat fragile, physically, but looked great in 2019 and 2020 (2021 not as much).

I think what Farnsworth was trying to do here with the 45 grades was to basically say, "there's so much I don't know here that I'll just guess they're average." Kind of a weird move from the apparent authority in this sort of thing, but I dunno. Obviously he's whiffed on both of these, but the players these guys are now don't really resemble the players we thought they were in 2016. All said, though, these were unusually low rankings at the time, and Farnsworth's caution seems misplaced.

13. Touki Toussaint (45) "Low Setup"

Feels like this might still be a viable outcome for Toussaint, albeit probably the best case scenario for him. Like Newcomb, the scouting report on Toussaint hasn't really changed since he first popped up (I'm not sure his "stuff" is as impressive now as it was in 2016, but that's more about comparison than individual evaluation).

This is one of the ones where the uncertainty with Toussaint's future role in Atlanta hinders my ability to say anything about Farnsworth's accuracy. He's probably a bullpen guy, but it remains to be seen whether that's a "AAAA up/down bullpen guy" or a "back end of the bullpen guy." Both are possible.

14. Mauricio Cabrera (45) "Low Setup"

This is basically the role we used Cabrera in for his one charmed season, where we called him up from like AA or something and he posted a sub-3 ERA and went toe-to-toe with Aroldis Chapman on the MLB pitch velocity chart. If you imagine that Cabrera retired immediately after that, then Farnsworth was spot on.

Unfortunately, in real life Cabrera got hurt, then was so broadly ineffective in rehab appearances that neither Atlanta nor future teams saw fit to bring him back. He's now pitching in Mexico with an ERA north of 20.

15. Chris Ellis (45) "Low Setup"

Man, remember this guy? I barely do. He was the non-Newcomb return from the Andrelton Simmons trade. Turns out he did eventually make the majors with Kansas City, somehow, where he posted an ERA of 0 on... 1 IP. Cool. Farnsworth essentially thought he would be a major league reliever; in real life Ellis is probably a little bit less than that. We can call this a whiff, but Ellis is still plugging away out there in AAA.

16. Daniel Castro (45) "Platoon/Util"

Castro, one of the staples of the Atlanta rebuild, was technically a utility player in the major leagues for a reasonable amount of time. The fact that he played that role on one of the worst teams (and then went to Colorado to repeat it) is, I guess, where Farnsworth's ranking runs into trouble. Castro was never going to make 1.5 WAR a year or whatever Farnsworth's system thinks a 45 corresponds to. He describes Castro as a "ground-ball-hitting machine" and I cannot tell if he thinks this is a good thing.

17. Braxton Davidson (40) "Bench"

This one is a whiff. Davidson never made it out of A+. Not much to say here. Farnsworth's evaluation reads like most other writeups of Davidson from the same time (it may actually be less enthusiastic than others).

18. Ricardo Sanchez (40) "Spot Start/Middle RP"

Sanchez was like 18 years old when Farnsworth wrote this. He was someone whose prospect status was subject to undue pressure that came from a premature 40-man selection (one of Anthopoulos's first moves as GM, an attempt to subvert potential Rule 5 claims). Eventually he made the majors with STL in 2020, where he pitched 5.1 innings and didn't look great. I think he's still in STL's AAA team but isn't playing for some reason. He's 24 years old.

I don't really feel comfortable making a call on this either way. He hasn't been good at the major league level in a uselessly-small sample. On the other hand, he should be playing in AA or AAA. And, to that end, a spot starter/relief pitcher is pretty much the role for which he continues to be groomed.

19. Tyrell Jenkins (40) "Spot Start/Middle RP"

Remember this dude? There was a lot of excitement about Jenkins back in the day--largely because the major league team was full of guys with computer-generated names like David Aardsma or Donnie Veal or something, and they all sucked. Unfortuantely, Jenkins's legacy was essentially to join the rebuild trash heap. Farnsworth thought he could work well as a bullpen guy moreso than a starter, but Atlanta cut bait on him and turned him into Luke Jackson (an underrated success of a trade, really). He has since left baseball, joined softball, and then got suspended from softball for a year due to his participation in a massive on-field brawl.

This is the point in this list where evaluating Farnsworth's success or failure kind of stops making sense. Did he peg Jenkins correctly? Farnsworth says,

I have doubts about him finding the consistency he would need to be a starter, but he is an interesting prospect for bullpen conversion where he can scrap his changeup and concentrate on making his fastball/curve combo as tough to hit as possible.

It turns out he did, indeed, lack the consistency to be a starter, but his bullpen conversion wasn't successful either.

20. Rio Ruiz (40) "Bench"

This one is probably accurate to Ruiz's actual skill, but surprisingly undersells what Ruiz actually became. After we let him go, Ruiz became the starting 3B on the absolutely horrible Orioles, and has only recently stopped being that (he was claimed off waivers by Colorado and is in AAA now). It didn't really go well for him in Baltimore, despite the fact that he was legitimately a starting player, and one has to assume he would've been a last-resort bench option for most other teams. This is essentially where he is now: on the cusp of being a bench player on a bad team. Farnsworth notes that he will have to lift more balls to be successful; that seems true, and it is something he never quite did. I always wanted Ruiz to succeed with Atlanta. Oh well.

21. Andrew Thurman (40) "Middle RP"

This was the first name on the list that I read and went, "who on earth is that guy?" Thurman never made the majors. He was in that Carolina Mudcats bus crash that derailed a number of careers. This one is a whiff but not by much; it's hard to really ding Farnsworth for failing to predict how these injuries would play out.

--

I'm not really keeping track of Farnsworth's successes and failures, but I would point out at this point that most of his writeups read as reasonable, if at times underdeveloped (Riley, Soroka, Fried, and Allard being notable examples here). The point of this was never to figure out how many guys he got right and how many guys he got wrong. Rather, I had an inkling that this guy's list might not have actually been that bad, in retrospect, and having gone through it now, I think I was right. A longer form of this kind of analysis, which I'm not going to do because I've already written so much, would compare this list to another list of similar provenance. In a very unscientific way, I'm just comparing these projections to the real-life outcomes of these players. I'm also not trying to compare this list to other ATL prospect lists from the same time period--like I said, much of the anger about this particular list arose from the fact that it diverged wildly from the fan consensus. That much remains true, but I'm more curious about whether Farnsworth was actually on to something.

Remember at the beginning of all of this, I suggested that people got mad about this list for a few distinct reasons: the absence of certain players, the placements of certain players in high positions on the list, and the inscrutability of the ranking system itself. I think the absence argument was absolutely valid at the time, and Farnsworth's revisions don't really add a whole lot except for some comments that flux between apologetic and defensive postures. The rankings, on the other hand, are still off, but not nearly as much as we would have thought back in 2016. Weber is obviously too high, as is Povse. Fried and Soroka are obviously too low, although both players were relative question marks for most evaluators, not just Farnsworth. Gant seemed too high, and still is at number two, but it's not actually too insane in retrospect to give him a top-10 spot in this list. There's also this line in the "prospects of note" section:

Ronald Acuna is young hitter who already has some ability to drive the ball gap to gap, and played an easy outfield in Rookie ball.

But nobody in November of 2015 thought anything of this.

If anything, going back through this really does point up some of the flaws in any kind of "future value" system for prospect evaluation. Farnsworth's criteria usually produce an accurate future role (bench bats, middle relievers, etc.), but the estimated WAR values are usually way off. And once you get past #12 or so, it's all quibbling around the margins. Prospect writers produce stuff like this because they know their audience wants this kind of content, but I am increasingly convinced that prospect evaluation as a whole would be better off it it did away entirely with rankings and instead focused on useful groupings of different types of players. And I wonder how many of the issues with Farnsworth's rankings were baked into the flaws of a self-imposed grading rubric which tries to quantify, standardize, and compare inherently incomparable skills and projected abilities.

Anyway, did we learn anything from this? Not really. Farnsworth's list was bad in a number of ways, but not as many as you probably thought back in 2015. In nearly every case his qualitative assessments are solid, and sometimes quite prescient; his quantitative evaluations, on the other hand, are super weird. Oh, and he was probably right about John Gant. Kind of a limited payoff, I have to admit. But you've now killed however much time you were hoping to kill by reading a fan post on a SBNation baseball website, so for that, you're welcome.

--

For fun, I've also included Farnsworth's "players of note" and "quick hits" sections, which aren't ranked, and looked them up to see how things played out for them. Bolded names made the majors.

"Players of note":

Dustin Peterson (Now: AAAA 5th OF type guy, majors w/ATL and DET)

Luke Dykstra (Now: out of baseball, never made it past AA)

Jason Hursh (Now: out of baseball, came up to pitch in ATL a few times and was bad)

Sean Godfrey (Now: never made it past AA, now a hitting coach in the Houston farm system)

Connor Lien (Now: in AA with SEA)

Johan Camargo (Now: AAAA bench guy with ATL who has flashed better and flashed much worse)

"Quick Hits":

Dian Toscano (not real)

Joseph Odom (Now: backup catcher who made the majors with SEA and TBR)

Lucas Herbert (Now: out of baseball)

Ronald Acuna (Now: holy shit lol)

Isranel Wilson (Now: in AA for LAA with a SLG over .500)

Juan Yepez (Now: in AAA for STL, pretty successful minor league track record overall)

Randy Ventura (Now: never made it past A+, 80-grade "leaving professional baseball" tool)

Tanner Murphy (Now: Last seen in indy ball in 2019, never made it past AAA)

Jonathan Morales (Now: hitting below .100 at AAA for ATL)

Brandon Barker (Now: doing pretty well in indy ball, never made it past AAA)

Alec Grosser (Now: left baseball in 2016, went no further than Rome)

Ryan Clark (Now: MiLB FA signed with LAA this year, in AA)

Andy Otero (Now: MiLB FA signed with MIL this year, in AA)

Willians Astudillo (Now: universally beloved utility player in the majors)

* I think? Assume each team carries around 25 players... at the time, there were 7 teams: AAA, AA, A+, A, Danville, GCL, DSL... so that's 175, plus players in the international complex, players on various DLs, players added on mid-season, a draft of 30ish new players in July... I think that's around 200?

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